The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 is silent on the issue of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. This silence dates to the earlier Constitutions of 1962, 1966 and 1967. It is only the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act of 2012 that renders evidence obtained through torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment inadmissible. This means that evidence obtained through human rights violations other than torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is not covered by any other legislation in Uganda. The position is different in other jurisdictions such as South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, which have constitutional provisions on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The decisions that have been handed down by the Ugandan courts reflect various jurisprudential inconsistencies in dealing with this kind of evidence. This study delves into this lacuna and suggests proposals for reform.
Introduction
Uganda is a party to various international and regional instruments, which include the African Charter, 1 the Convention against Torture 2 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 which require it to deal appropriately with evidence obtained through human rights violations. There is, however, no domestic regulation of evidence obtained through human rights violations in Uganda. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 is silent on the topic. This silence is also evident in the Constitutions of 1962, 1966 and 1967 . In addition, the decisions handed down by the courts do not offer a consistent development of jurisprudence on the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations. The situation regarding evidence obtained through human rights violations would be different if there were guidance from consistent case law, or a constitutional directive.
When courts are faced with the question of the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations, they may use the reliability principle, because improperly obtained evidence may be as reliable as lawfully obtained evidence and may have a bearing on the innocence or guilt of an accused. 4 The courts may use the deterrent principle for the purpose of punishing a person who obtained the evidence improperly. 5 Alternatively, the courts may also follow the protective principle, whereby an accused does not suffer a disadvantage because of evidence obtained through human rights violations by investigators. 6 This article discusses the silence of the Constitution in comparison with the earlier Ugandan constitutions by looking at its drafting history and the wording of previous Constitutions in Uganda, and evaluating various criminal procedure laws. The purpose of doing so is to establish if there are any statutory provisions that deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. Thereafter the article evaluates decisions handed down by the courts from 1995 to 2014, to establish whether there is a developed jurisprudence, the extent to which the jurisprudence is consistent, and whether there is justification for a constitutional amendment. The article provides a comparative study of South African law, because it has a constitutional provision on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. This is coupled with a discussion of the most recent trends in case law, to justify the need for reform. A conclusion and recommendations follow.
The Constitution is silent on the issue of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. It provides that:
(1) Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual are inherent and not granted by the State. (2) The rights and freedoms of the individual and groups enshrined in this Chapter shall be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs and agencies of Government and by all persons. 7 This Article guarantees rights for all individuals in Uganda by virtue of their nature as human beings. In addition, any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom has been infringed or threatened may apply to a competent court for redress. 8 While these provisions guarantee rights and offer enforcement, they do not provide a directive on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. It would be desirable that constitutional rights which are violated in the course of gathering evidence should be subjected to a directive on how to deal with evidence so gathered. Some of these rights include the right to a fair trial, 9 the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, 10 and the right to be charged in accordance with the law. 11 Other rights are the rights to privacy, 12 personal liberty, 13 and against self-incrimination. 14 Some of the pre-trial guarantees for an accused person include a presumption of innocence until he or she is proved or pleads guilty; 15 the right to be informed immediately in a language that the person understands of the nature of the offence; 16 and the provision of adequate time and facilities to prepare his or her defence. 17 These pre-trial guarantees do not, however, provide for a remedy where evidence has been obtained through human rights violations. The relief provided by the Constitution relates to an application for redress for the infringement of a human right and not evidence obtained through human rights violations. 18 Other jurisdictions such as South Africa, 19 Canada, 20 Zimbabwe 21 and Kenya 22 have constitutional provisions on how to deal with this evidence. Hong Kong lacks a constitutional provision but it has developed consistent case law which deals with evidence obtained through human rights violations. 23 It may be concluded from these instances that there is need for a developed, consistent jurisprudence with regard to evidence obtained through human rights violations. The consistency may be by way of statutory provision or case law. This study sets out to establish if there is any statutory provision in Uganda dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. Thereafter, an analysis of case law from the Supreme Court is done. An evaluation of the South African approach is done to show why it is inevitable to have a developed jurisprudence. Thereafter the author draws from the existing jurisprudence to justify the need for reform.
Drafting history of the Constitutions of Uganda
Uganda has had a turbulent constitutional history, with four Constitutions since independence. 24 A look at the drafting history of the four Constitutions gives an insight into the silence of the Constitution on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The Constitution, 1962 referred to as the Independence Constitution, was drafted in London by the British, as the colonial masters. 25 An examination of the broader context within which it was drafted reveals that it was more of a political Constitution geared at creating a balance of interests between political factions in 17 Article 28(3)(c) of the Constitution
18
Article 50(1) of the Constitution provides that "Any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom guaranteed under this Constitution has been infringed or threatened, is entitled to apply to a competent court for redress which may include compensation". Constitutions of the Republic of Uganda, 1962 , 1966 , 1967 and 1995 Wapakhabulo "Managing the Constitution" 24 114. Rights Commission was not accorded the status of a court of record, 38 because it is not a judicial body.
When the draft Constitution was presented to the Constituent Assembly for debate, the delegates acknowledged two issues that were instructive for the final outcome of the debate: first, that the aim of the Bill of Rights was to enhance the protection, promotion and enjoyment of human rights, 39 and second, that since Uganda was a signatory to many international instruments, its commitment would be judged by the manner in which the Constitution provided safeguards to avoid a violation of human rights in the country. 40 The Constituent Assembly, however, throughout the debates on the Bill of Rights, did not debate the issue of a directive regarding evidence obtained through human rights violations. The debates focused to a great extent on the recommendations of the Odoki Commission. 41 The drafting history shows that the omission of a constitutional directive by the drafters was not by design. This significant directive, which was omitted, could easily have been corrected through an amendment to the Constitution or by enacting legislation to complement the Constitution. In addition, the judiciary could have developed a consistent jurisprudence through case law to remedy the default. At the time of writing this article, neither has Parliament amended the Constitution nor has the judiciary developed a consistent jurisprudence on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations.
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Analysis of legislation
The current pieces of legislation do not adequately provide for a mode of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 42 has a provision which is limited to evidence obtained through torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT). Section 14(1) thereof provides: interpretation of the Act is that where there is a violation of the rights of an individual, the evidence may still be admitted on the grounds of national security.
While the Constitution is silent, legislation that governs criminal justice has done little to solve the issue of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. Most of the legislation has not been amended since the passing of the Constitution in 1995. 68 Therefore the silence of the Constitution is exacerbated by the inadequate ability of the existing legislation to complement it in dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations.
Analysis of case law
The courts have handed down different decisions on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. An analysis of these decisions helps us establish how the courts have dealt with this evidence, and what can be done to improve the situation. In Namulobi Hasadi v Uganda (Namulobi), 69 the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court on five grounds: 70 first, that the confession had been repudiated in the course of the trial; 71 second, that the confession had been improperly recorded since the appellant had not signed it; 72 third, that the apparent insertion of the name of a detective was evidence of a pre-written statement rather than a voluntary statement; 73 fourth, that the confession had been obtained as a result of torture; 74 and last, the confession had been recorded after the accused had spent a week in custody 75 beyond the mandatory 48 hours as determined by the Constitution. 76 The Court upheld the admission of the confession in evidence on the ground that it did not occasion any injustice to the appellant. 77 With regard to the irregular recording of the confession, the Court stated that although the 68
The Criminal Procedure Code Act, Magistrates Courts Act, and Trial on Indictment Act do not contain any substantive amendments made since 1995 to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations.
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RD NANIMA PER / PELJ 2016 (19) 10 recording of the confession took place in a room occupied by other people, these people were busy about their own duties. 78 The Court recognised the fact that the police do not usually have enough rooms for a recording officer to be alone with an accused, 79 and that the appellant had never complained about an irregularity in the mode of recording the confession. 80 In addition, the law that the appellant relied on to claim that the recording of the confession was in a language he did not understand had been repealed. 81 With regard to the allegation that the appellant had been tortured before the confession was recorded, the Court relied on the evidence of another accused person who had been arrested and detained with the appellant. 82 This person had stated that the appellant had not been tortured, which he knew since they had been in the same police cell for the entire week, from the time of arrest. 83 The Court noted that there was evidence other than the confession which would sustain the conviction of the appellant. This included corroborative evidence such as informal confessions made by the accused to the witnesses for the prosecution, and evidence of the appellant's volunteering to give information to the police, which evidence had led to the recovery of items the belonging to the victim. 84 It is clear that obtaining the confession after the accused had been in custody beyond the mandatory 48 hours was a violation of the appellant's right to liberty. 85 In admitting this evidence, the Court was setting a precedent that permitted for disregard of the rules governing the recording of confessions and that aided the voluntary recording of a confession. The Court seemed to state that provided the illegal presence of other people in a room where a confession was recorded did not directly interfere with the recording of the confession, the Court would admit it. In addition, if the confession was corroborated, the Court would admit it. The rationale of the case was based on the reliability theory and to admit the confession on the basis of its probative value, instead of deterring the police from using illegal methods in obtaining the evidence. By upholding the confession, the Court condoned the illegal actions of the police 86 and went against its own principle that required that it not uphold an illegality once it was brought to its attention. 87 In Uganda v Kalawudio Wamala (Kalawudio), 88 the accused was indicted for the offence of rape. 89 The prosecution sought to tender an exculpatory statement made by the accused person. 90 Just as in Namulobi, the statement in Kalawudio was made after the accused had been in custody beyond the mandatory 48 hours. 91 The High Court declined to admit the statement because it was made after the accused had been in custody for 10 days, which exceeded the statutory 48 hours. 92 Secondly, the statement was recorded contrary to the rules in the Evidence (Statement to Police Officers) Rules. 93 The rule referred to states:
If a police officer decides that the statement of any person should be taken down in writing and is likely to be tendered in evidence in any proceedings, then -(a) if there is present any police officer literate in the language being used by such person, the police officer literate in such language shall write down the statement as nearly possible in the actual words used by the person making the statement … . 94 The Court noted that while the accused could speak the Luganda dialect, the police officer recorded the confession in English. The Court stated that the conduct of the police officer was contrary to this Rule. 95 The other reasons that the court gave for not admitting the exculpatory statement were that it protected the accused, that the court had to uphold the public interest, and that it had to deter persons and organs of government from condoning a breach of human rights. 96 In addition, the admission of the confession would be against the tenets of the right to a fair trial. 97 the Supreme Court in Namulobi, to have been annulled by the repeal of section 24 of the Evidence Act. 98 Although the Court had not relied on Rule 7(a) to arrive at its decision, it made it clear that the statement was illegal because it had been recorded after the accused had been in police custody for more than the mandated 48 hours. 99 The illegal procuring of a statement from an accused for use against him at trial was found to be repugnant to the values and standards set out in the new Constitution (as it then was), and that the Court would not be complying with its duty if it admitted the statement and permitted the wrongful and unconstitutional conduct of the police or any other organ in its investigation of crime. 100 The Court took a cautious stand not to condone the improper excesses of the police, and used the protective theory to ensure that the accused did not suffer a disadvantage because of evidence obtained through human rights violations by the police. 101 This case illustrated a shift of the jurisprudence from the admission to the non-admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations.
In Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda (Ssewankambo), 102 the three appellants were convicted by the High Court of simple robbery. 103 The first and second appellants were arrested on the same day, and upon interrogation by the police they named the third appellant as a person who took part in the robbery. 104 The third appellant was subsequently arrested. All three appellants made confessions, giving detailed accounts of the parts they had played in the robbery. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the judges of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they admitted the confessions. 105 They asserted that the Court had not inquired from the defence as to whether it had any objection to the admission of the confessions, and a failure to do so on the part of the judge was a failure of justice. 106 The Court held that it was improper to admit the confessions. 107 This was because the trial judge had not given the defence (the appellants) an opportunity to say anything about the confessions before they were admitted. 108 The court re-98 Namulobi para 5. enunciated the principle that it is improper to admit a confession without subjecting it to a trial-within-a-trial. 109 This was so because in Article 28(3)a the Constitution provided for the right to the presumption of innocence that required that … where in a criminal trial, an accused has pleaded not guilty, the trial court must be cautious before admitting in evidence a confession statement allegedly made by an accused person prior to his trial.110
The Court stated further that … it is not proper or safe to admit a confession statement in evidence on the ground that counsel for the accused has not challenged or conceded to its admissibility. Unless the trial court ascertains from the accused that he or she admits having made the confession statement voluntarily, the court ought to hold the trial-within-a-trial to determine its admissibility. 111
In this case the Court upheld the rights to the presumption of innocence and against self-incrimination, where a confession was not subjected to the process of testing the voluntariness of the accused in making it. 112 The Court also noted some irregularities in the recording of the confessions. 113 First, the confessions of the first and second appellants had been recorded by the same officer, and this could have led him to be tempted to use the contents of the first statement in the second. 114 Second, a police officer who did not adequately understand the language of the appellants had not used an interpreter for the recording of the confession. 115 Third, the appellants claimed to have been assaulted by the police before their statements were recorded, yet no medical evidence was adduced to rebut this claim. 116 The decision served a triple purpose. It enhanced the presumption of innocence, and buttressed the need for the procedure of a trial-within-a-trial to ascertain the voluntariness of the making of the confession. It also upheld the right against self-incrimination of an accused from an adjudication perspective. This decision buttressed the duty of courts to ensure that they do not provide an enabling environment for self-incrimination by the accused. 117 The case also illustrated the move by the courts from a reliability perspective to a protective perspective in an attempt to protect the accused person from human rights violations by the police in the procurement of evidence.
In Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v Uganda (Walugembe) , 118 the first, second and third accused were indicted and convicted of three counts of robbery. Some of the facts on which their convictions were based were that the third appellant had told the police that they had gone to a certain swamp, where they had hidden goods they had stolen earlier on. 119 He had led the police to the scene and items, including a television and a video deck, had been recovered. In the course of their defence, all the appellants repudiated the confessions they had made to the police. 120 A confession is considered to be repudiated when the accused person acknowledges that although he made it, it was made involuntarily. 121 Where a confession is made involuntarily and the state seeks to tender the said confession in evidence, the rights of an accused against selfincrimination and to a presumption of innocence are violated. It is therefore proper that the Court satisfies itself that a confession was obtained voluntarily before it is admitted in evidence. The first and second appellants averred that the confessions had been obtained through torture; 122 that the recording of the statements had been irregular because they were recorded in English and not in the languages the appellants understood; 123 and that the confessions had been recorded by the same police officer. 124 It was also noted that the confession of the second appellant had been recorded in the presence of the officer in charge of the police station. The Court held that it was a misdirection to admit the confessions in the light of the irregularities in recording them. The rationale for this holding was that the confessions had not been meticulously tested as regards the voluntariness of their making. 125 The Court stated that it was prudent to establish the onus of proof and consider the irregular recording of the confessions. 126 In instances where the accused challenged the admissibility of a confession, the trial court was duty bound to have it proved in a trial-within-a-trial that the confessions had been made voluntarily. principle in Ssewankambo that it is not proper for a police officer to record statements from two accused persons in a single case that he is investigating. 128 In this case, the Court used the protective theory as a basis for the holding. In addition, the Court made it clear that the right procedure ought to be followed in recording confessions, which required that an investigating officer would not record the confessions of two accused persons in the same case before him. 129 The Court did not, however, pronounce itself on the standard of proof. It did by implication validate the decision in Kalawudio.
In Kizza Besigye v the Attorney General, 130 the applicants were re-arrested and detained illegally after the High Court granted them bail. 131 While this case did not involve the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations, it involved the continued prosecution of accused persons in disregard of their rights to liberty during trial. 132 The Court reiterated that the applicants had the constitutional rights to be tried before an independent and impartial body, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and to apply for bail. 133 Other rights included the right to protection from torture and CIDT, and a fair hearing. 134 On the basis of these facts, and with reference to persuasive decisions on the right to a fair trial from other jurisdictions, 135 the Court stated that it could not sanction the continued prosecution of the petitioners where during the proceedings their human rights had been violated. 136 The right to a fair trial referred to was based on the interruption of the court's adjudicating a criminal case, and not on the violation of rights during the collection of evidence. While the Court was of the view that the continued detention of the accused persons would have been a violation of their rights to liberty and security of person, it did not address this issue. That could be partly because the accused raised the grounds but failed to substantiate them. 137 The principles in this case are very instrumental in relaying the need for law enforcement agencies to respect human rights in the course of investigating a crime and during a trial. In addition, the Court reiterated its duty to enforce the provisions of the Constitution, regardless of how strong the evidence against the accused person was. 138 The Court suggested that the yardstick was whether a fair trial would be achieved, depending on the circumstances of each case. If the trial would be a waste of time and an abuse of the court process, then it would not be fair. 139 The Court's view that a prosecution instituted in breach of the law is a violation of the rights of the accused was instrumental in the continued development of the jurisprudence regarding evidence obtained through human rights violations.
In Uganda v Robert Ssekabira, 140 the eleven accused persons were arrested and detained, and then charged eleven days later. 141 Before they were charged the accused had been in police custody without charge. This was contrary to the right to be promptly informed upon their arrest of the charges against them. 142 It is important to note that the police and the prosecutors had to ensure that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions was obtained before charging anyone under the Anti-terrorism Act. 143 Although the failure to get consent was not a human rights violation, it would amount to an impropriety on the part of the police or the prosecutor. It would be expected that the prosecutor, as an officer of the court, would adequately guide it with regard to all the administrative requirements that had to be complied with before the accused persons were brought before it. Therefore the evidence that had been procured after the initial 48 hours of their detention had been obtained in violation of their right to liberty. 144 The prosecution conceded to the violations of the right to a fair trial since the accused had been remanded beyond 48 hours; 145 however, it requested the Court to take into account the circumstances that led to the violation of the Constitution. 146 The major issue before the Court was whether in the light of the constitutional violations there was any statutory authority or case law that granted the Court the power to excuse the breach of a constitutional provision. 147 a result arrived at a wrong decision, and ordered that the case be retried before another Magistrate. 157 This case is important for the present purposes because while the Court took issue with the evidence obtained through human rights violations, it did not offer any recommendations on how to deal with evidence obtained through entrapment. In this case, after the police had used a trap to arrest the respondent, they forced the respondent's colleagues in the office to sign the Search Certificate as witnesses to the recovery of the bribe from the office of the Respondent. 158 While Ekungu involved evidence of a search certificate corroborating the evidence of recovery of the bribe from the respondent, most cases decided are limited to confessions, which require a court to conduct a trial-within-a trial before the confession is admitted. 159 The Court stated that the mode of arrest and the requirements for search certificates needed to be reexamined. 160 The Court relied on the cogency of other evidence and a consideration of whether it was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The evidence would not, however, be sufficiently substantial to sustain a conviction where the mode of acquiring it involved the use of duress to compel witnesses to sign search certificates. It was prudent to establish the process of conducting the search, acquiring the evidence, and signing of the search certificate. If this process had been tainted by human rights violations, the Court had to determine whether the violation of third party rights would affect the admission of the prosecution's evidence. 161 The illegality involved in procuring the search certificate and the violation of the accused's right to dignity 162 were upheld by the Court in allowing the accused's appeal. Since courts are becoming cognisant of the use of entrapment and showing their distaste for is, it is only proper that entrapment should be regulated. While the Court took issue with the use of traps, it neither offered solutions nor held that it was improper to admit the evidence. The Court neither used the protection theory nor clearly embraced the reliability theory.
The practice of setting police traps is an unusual crime prevention strategy based predominantly upon deceptive law enforcement techniques, 163 and it needs to be regulated. This article shows that the status of the evidence obtained through human rights violations is a significant question in the light of the legislative framework and the judicial development of jurisprudence. The Constitution is silent on how the courts should deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. It does create a working framework for the enforcement of the right to a fair hearing for an accused person, but fails to secure strict observance of this right in so far as it is silent on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The lack of provisions in criminal procedure legislation exacerbates the situation. A few Uganda cases have adequately grappled with this issue. These include Kalawudio, Ssewankambo, Walugembe, Besigye and Ssekabira. The other cases have not deal with this issue adequately. Before a conclusion is drawn and recommendations are made, a brief examination will be undertaken of the South African approach to evidence obtained through human rights violations in the belief that this will contribute to the value of the conclusions drawn.
The South African approach
South Africa has a constitutional provision dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations and a wealth of case law for the purpose of interpreting the provision. The Constitution of 1996 provides that:
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 167 From the wording of section 35 (5) 173 Therefore, in instances of the violation of statutory rights, the common law exclusionary rule or the application of judicial discretion may be used. 174 The distinction between the common law exclusionary rule and the rule under section 35 (5) is that, unlike the latter, the former applies to all cases, and not only criminal cases. 175 Unlike section 35(5), which requires a court to subject evidence that has been obtained through human rights violations to the test set therein, the common law exclusionary rule is a discretionary remedy that a judicial officer exercises if the admission of a given piece of evidence will operate unfairly against the accused. him, 183 the right to remain silent 184 and the consequences of not remaining silent. 185 These rights are also provided for in Uganda's Constitution. 186 Other guarantees are the right not to be compelled to make a confession or admission that could be used in evidence against an accused, 187 the right to be brought to court within 48 hours, 188 and the right to be presumed innocent till proven guilty. 189 Where the safeguards are disregarded by the investigating authority while collecting evidence, a violation of the constitutional rights occurs. This consequently creates an enabling environment for the accused person to invoke the section.
Unfairness of the trial is one of the grounds for the exclusion of evidence under the section. In S v Tandwa (Tandwa), 190 the Court noted that some of the factors that may be grounds for the exclusion of evidence include the severity of the human rights violation, the degree of prejudice to the accused, the need to balance public policy on fighting crime and the interests of society, and the need to balance the due process of law against crime control. Therefore, where the conduct of the police is deliberate and flagrant, 191 a court will be inclined not to admit the evidence, because it would render the trial unfair. In the view of the author, these grounds apply to both the unfairness of the trial and placing the administration of justice into disrepute. This is so because, although the Court in Tandwa held that the grounds listed are relevant in establishing the unfairness of the trial of the accused, 192 they added that what is unfair to an accused will always be detrimental to the administration of justice. 193 Where the admission of the evidence brings the administration of justice into disrepute, then the evidence will not be admitted. In examining this ground, a court looks at factors like the presence of good faith on the part of law enforcement officers. In Soci the Court was reluctant to uphold the evidence obtained as a result of the failure of a police officer to perform the right procedure before the accused made a pointing out. 194 Other factors which the courts consider include: the nature and seriousness of the The Courts have added to the jurisprudence of section 35(5) through interpretation. They have dealt with the issue of a causal link between the violation of the right and the collection of evidence. While the casual link may vary in magnitude, this variance is not a condition that determines whether the evidence may be admitted. Its degree of severity is not a condition precedent to the determination of the admissibility of evidence. A court examines each case on its merits. In Tandwa the Court held that there is a high degree of prejudice when there is a close causal connection between the rights violation and the subsequent self-incriminating acts of the accused. 200 In S v Orrie 201 the Court held that a weak causal link between the violation and the evidence would not render the evidence obtained through human rights violations inadmissible. In S v Mthembu 202 the court held that where torture had irredeemably tainted the evidence of a third party, the subsequent voluntary testimony in court could not alter the fact that the evidence had been obtained through torture. In addition, evidence can be excluded when a third party's rights have been violated in the process of obtaining evidence against an accused. 203 The above principles show that if the rigid rule on the use of the intensity of a causal link is used, judicial integrity and the purpose of the constitutional directive would be compromised. The position is different in Canada. Canadian courts do not require the presence of a causal link to justify the application of section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 204 The reason advanced is that the causal connection is too narrow and difficult to apply and its existence is therefore not determinative. This was a departure from the earlier position of the courts that required the presence of a causal link. This In instances where evidence is obtained by third parties or vigilantes in violation of an accused's rights, it is subjected to section 35(5) before a court exercises its discretion to admit it. In S v Songezo Mini (Mini), 208 the Court subjected the evidence obtained by security officers to section 35(5) scrutiny before admitting it, because the evidence had not been obtained by the police but by other law enforcement officers. 209 The Court did not reject the evidence outright but rather subjected it to the test under section 35(5) and admitted only such evidence as passed that test. 210 In instances where there had been a violation of the rights of the accused before the evidence was obtained, the evidence was not admitted. In instances where the violation of the rights of the accused persons had occurred after the evidence had been obtained, the evidence was admitted. Mini paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20 and 23. 210 Mini paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20 and 23. 211 Mini paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20 These are: a lack of good faith on the part of vigilantes; the non-justification of their conduct on the basis of public safety or emergency concerns, the seriousness of the violation of the appellant's rights to privacy; the freedom and security of person and dignity; and the availability of lawful means to acquire the evidence. This approach enhances the right to a fair trial from the pre-trial stages.
The answer to the question of who bears the burden of proof to establish that there has been a violation of rights in obtaining evidence is not clear in South Africa. While two decisions have varying views on the matter, a textual reading of the section requires the state to bear the burden. In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Viljoen (Viljoen) 214 the Court held that the accused has to show a violation of his or her rights before it makes a decision on whether to admit the evidence. 215 In other words, the accused should prove a violation of a right as a threshold requirement to the application of section 35(5). This meant that the accused had to violate his right against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent if it were to be proved that there had been a violation of his rights. Conversely, in S v Mgcina (Mgcina) 216 the Court placed the burden on the prosecution to disprove that the evidence had been obtained in an unconstitutional manner. 217 The Court seems to agree with the common law principle that it was for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not for the accused to prove his innocence. 218 In the author's view, Viljoen was decided erroneously and cannot pass the constitutional test, because the accused's right to remain silent would be infringed. The case of Mgcina offers a purposive approach to the application of section 35(5). Schwikkard suggests two alternative solutions for the situation. First, the accused alleges a violation but need not prove that the evidence was obtained in violation of his or her constitutional rights. 219 Second, in the course of holding a trial-within-a-trial a distinction is made between matters of fact as opposed to matters of judgment and value, which would point to the proof of guilt. The two alternatives enable a court to establish the existence of the factual violation of the rights of an accused on a balance of probabilities, without forming a value judgement. At this stage of the hearing, the court would not be concerned with the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt but only with the admission of the evidence.
The procedure used for the application of the exclusionary rule is a trialwithin-a-trial to test the admissibility of evidence. The application is made before the evidence is admitted. 220 This is done when the accused objects to the admission of a piece of evidence. The reason for this procedure is to ensure that the accused can testify on the issue concerning the admissibility of the impugned evidence without exposing himself to cross-examination as to his guilt. In S v Ntzweli, 221 it was held that the lower court's refusal to hold a trial-within-a-trial to determine the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search amounted to a failure of justice. 222
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Conclusion and recommendations
The cases that have been discussed fall into three categories of jurisprudence. The first category involves a situation where a court admits the evidence obtained through human rights violations, as occurred in Namulobi. If the court is able to satisfy itself that admission of the evidence does not occasion an injustice to the accused person, it will admit the evidence. The yardstick for the admission of this evidence is the probative value of the evidence based on a judgment of its reliability. It follows that a court is more inclined to follow the reliability theory on the grounds that illegally obtained evidence may be as reliable as lawfully obtained evidence and may have a bearing on the innocence or guilt of an accused. 223 This line of jurisprudence requires a court to hold that the reliability of the evidence is of greater importance than the protection of the accused's rights. This justification is done through the use of evidence that corroborates the evidence that points to the guilt of the accused. 224 A court is more inclined to labour to distinguish the cases before handing down its judgement. In Namulobi, the court distinguished the facts in Edong v Uganda to justify its decision. 225 In Edong, the appellant made two statements. In the first one, he denied any involvement in the murder, and in the second he volunteered information as regards the way he committed the murder. At the hearing of the case he denied the confession, claiming it was obtained through ) 26 coercion, and the court agreed. In addition, the confession was the only source of evidence, unlike the situation in Namulobi, where there was evidence of the appellant's voluntary co-operation with the police to recover items of the victim, and confessions to various witnesses as to how he committed the offence. 226 Unlike Edong, even if the confession in Namulobi were to eb expunged he would still be convicted on the other existing evidence. 227 Finally, the holding in Namulobi shows that the court went to great lengths to show that there was no unfairness occasioned to the accused at his trial.
The second category involves a situation where a Court has not admitted evidence obtained through human rights violations. This category forms the bulk of most of the cases, which include Kawaludio, Ssewankambo, Besigye and Ssekabira. It is important to note that in all these cases the Court rejects the admission of improperly obtained evidence on the grounds that its admission would be against the aspirations of the Constitution, 228 the trial court had not followed the procedure to ascertain the voluntariness of the confession, 229 or the police had not followed the right procedure in recording the confessions, 230 that the court would not sanction the continued prosecution of the accused where there was a violation of their rights to a fair trial, 231 that the yardstick for establishing whether the accused would have a fair trial was premised on whether a fair trial would be achieved in the circumstances of each case, or that the trial would be a waste of time and an abuse of the court process. 232 Furthermore, the courts upheld the protective theory over the reliability theory, 233 because the Constitution mandated it to do so and not to condone the excesses of the police. 234 This line of jurisprudence was frequently evident in the period 1996 to 2014, and it was rooted in the need to uphold the ideals of the Constitution. The four cases of Kawaludio, Ssewankambo, Besigye and Ssekabira show an attempt by the courts to balance the fairness of a trial and at the same time not to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In the light of the three models of jurisprudence, it would be most appropriate for the courts to embrace the second model, which upholds the protection of the accused from the excesses of the investigative organs as much as possible. This model ensures fairness at a trial and that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute. It seems to embrace section 35(5) of the South African Constitution in that it ensures that the constitutional rights of an accused are not trampled on. The first model would be appropriate where the probative value of the evidence outweighs the manner in which it was obtained and does not occasion an injustice to the accused person. This would technically mean that all evidence is presumed to be admissible until it is proved that it was obtained in a manner that violated the constitutional rights of an accused person. It is on this basis that the jurisprudence could grow systematically, since there would be a constitutional provision as a normative framework for continued growth and consistency. The Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS), a priority sector of government that co-ordinates the activities of the institutions that deal with justice, like the Judiciary, the DPP, and the police, 238 could consult on the workability of a constitutional provision to deal with evidence obtained though human rights violations.
To this end, therefore, the Constitution should be amended to provide for a directive on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations. This should not be an instance of copying the contents of a Constitution from another jurisdiction. It is proposed that the amendment should at least provide for a dual test of fairness of the trial and of the administration of justice. The test of public opinion might conflict with the administration of justice. The amendment could be placed after Article 50 of the Constitution, which provides for a right of redress. The principles of the need for a causal link, standing, and evidence procured by third parties should be left to the courts to develop as the amendment is applied. The amendment should have clarity to compel the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence in the form of information, statements and confessions provided that they do not render a trial unfair or are detrimental to the administration of justice. Chapter eight of the Constitution provides for the Courts of Judicature. The courts of record in Uganda's legal system should be empowered to develop the common law in instances where there is an apparent problem with the law, which cannot be solved. Apart from confessions, one of the problems exacerbating the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations is the lack of a law to subject this evidence to a trial-within-a-trial to establish whether or not it was obtained voluntarily. The courts' ability to develop the common law will enable them to subject all issues of admissibility of evidence to a trial-within-a-trial.
There should be the enactment of a DPP Act, to provide for the duties of a prosecutor to the accused, the victim and the court in instances where evidence is obtained through human rights violations. While the principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial are applicable in Uganda, as a State Party to the African Charter, they are not reflected in any criminal procedure law. This diminishes the chances of their being used by conventional judicial officers who follow the law as it is written.
The police should be compelled to stop using procedures that taint the voluntariness of an accused and other individuals to provide evidence. The procedure from arrest to the production of a person in court for plea should be streamlined to avoid human rights violations. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code Act should provide for the limitation of using entrapments to acquire evidence and should provide guidelines for the use of entrapments. This would enhance professionalism in investigations, while at the same time upholding human rights in the process. The Police Act could also be amended to provide for the obligations of investigators in the course of gathering evidence. This legislation would play a significant role in preventing human rights violations and procedural irregularities in the process of collecting evidence. RD NANIMA PER / PELJ 2016 (19) 29 The courts should be dynamic in making decisions which enhance the jurisprudence relating to evidence obtained through human rights violations. There should be a shift from reliance on a procedural approach to a human rights approach in making decisions. The decisions made should reflect the need to uphold human rights as the first priority. The procedural aspects of the chain of investigations should be used to enhance a fair trial. There is a heavy reliance on the reliability theory of evidence. A shift to the use of the deterrent and protective theories should also be made. This would deter the police from committing human rights violations and protect accused persons being placed at an unfair disadvantage due to the conduct of the police. The burden of proof should be on the prosecution to prove that evidence was obtained without the violation of any of the rights of the accused. This would serve to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, the protection of the right not to self-incriminate, and the right to remain silent. 
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